Mortgage prepayments can contribute significantly to fluctuations in M2 growth rates. These mortgage prepayment effects are primarily driven by certain rules of mortgage-backed-security (MBS) insurers that require mortgage servicers to hold in M2-type deposits the prepayment proceeds due to MBS investors. This paper provides a methodology for estimating prepayment effects on M2. The effects are estimated separately for refinancing and home sales. The results indicate that excluding the mortgage prepayment effects from M2 produces smoother monthly growth rates. The stability of the relationship between money and GDP as measured by M2 velocity is also increased. Refinancing prepayments account for most of the prepayment effects on M2.
INTRODUCTION and SUMMARY
The growth of M2 is affected by a range of fundamental factors, such as general economic activity, the opportunity cost of M2, and equity market fluctuations, as well as by certain special factors.
1 Special factors include unusual overseas currency shipments, the century date change (Y2K), September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and mortgage prepayments.
Their effects are usually erratic and tend to increase the volatility of M2 growth, creating instability in its relationship to GDP. Since data for M2 are available at a higher frequency than GDP data, M2 can also serve as a leading economic indicator if its relationship with GDP is stable. Thus, it is important to account for the effects of special factors on M2. Mortgage prepayment effects on M2 are studied here.
Mortgage prepayments are a potentially important source of fluctuations in M2 growth.
Over 2002 and 2003, the boom and bust of mortgage prepayments appear to have increased the volatility of M2 and, thus, reduced the stability of the relationship between M2 and GDP. This raises two questions: (1) how do mortgage prepayments contribute to volatility in M2; and (2) what is the size of their effects. This study attempts to address these two questions.
While there is a vast literature on mortgage prepayments, little attention has been given to their effects on the monetary aggregates. The prepayment literature is mostly concerned with individual mortgages and mortgage pools, and has focused on two areas: (1) determining factors that affect mortgage prepayments and modeling prepayment decisions (e.g. Green and Shoven, 1986; Richard and Roll, 1988; Hakim, 1997; Mattey and Wallace, 1998; Hayre, Chaudhary and Young , 2000; and J.P. Morgan, 2003) ; and (2) the effects of mortgage prepayments on the valuation of mortgage backed securities (MBSs) (e.g. Dunn and McConnell, 1981; Schwartz and Torous, 1989; Spahr and Sunderman, 1992; Stanton, 1995; and Jegadeesh 2000) . Results from these studies indicate that mortgage prepayments are positively related to the spread between the contract interest rate to the prevailing mortgage rate, the length of periods of low mortgage rates, loan size, mortgage loan to house value (LTV) ratios, and appreciation of housing prices. Other 2 findings include mortgage prepayments being negatively related to mortgage rates, loan age, and MBS pool burnout rates; and prepayments having seasonality and calendar effects. These various effects on mortgage prepayments may depend on whether prepayments are for mortgage refinancing or housing sales. However, existing studies have not distinguished the reason for prepayments.
In a short article, Duca (1990) estimated the effects of refinancing prepayments for MBSs insured by Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Ginnie Mae (GNMA) on demand deposit growth. His estimation is based on prepayments derived as the differences between current new MBS issues and the changes in outstanding MBSs. 2 Duca found that adjusting demand deposits for estimated prepayment effects enhanced the accuracy of model forecasts for demand deposit growth. This paper differs substantially from Duca's article in terms of scope of the study, accuracy and completeness of the data, and the methodology used to estimate mortgage prepayment effects on M2.
The effects of mortgage prepayments on M2 growth are primarily driven by institutional rules that require mortgage prepayments be deposited in M2 accounts while being held by MBS pool servicers. As a result, when mortgage prepayments rise, M2 growth is boosted. When mortgage prepayments slow, M2 growth is depressed.
Mortgage prepayments held in M2 accounts cannot be measured directly but must be estimated from mortgage prepayments. Mortgage prepayment data are also limited (for example, see Duca 1990 and footnote 2 below), and prepayment effects on M2 depend on aggregate mortgage prepayments. A contribution of this paper is to estimate aggregate mortgage prepayments from historical data on mortgage originations reported under Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The HMDA data cover from 76 to 90 percent of monthly amounts of 2 There are issues concerning the accuracy of prepayments data derived this way in terms of timing and inclusion. Mortgage data published by FNMA and GNMA are calculated based on an "internal reserve accounting" method, which records data for new issues, sales, and purchases in real time, but data on liquidations and mortgage outstanding balances with a one-month delay. Liquidation data released by all GSEs include different kinds of principal paid back, ranging from foreclosures, curtailments, scheduled and unscheduled repayments, etc., for multifamily and 1-4 single-family home mortgages. In addition, repurchases by lenders are included in liquidations but excluded from MBS outstanding balances, as lenders can buy a delinquent loan out of its MBS pool and keep it in portfolio. Thus, lender buyouts cause an under-statement of MBS outstanding balances and over-statement of liquidation/prepayment amounts. During a low mortgage rate period, such as in 2002, lenders have a strong 4 measured by M2 velocity is more stable than actual M2. Furthermore, the results reveal that refinancing prepayments account for most of the prepayment effects on M2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the flow of mortgage proceeds from lenders to MBS holders. Section 3 describes: (1) the estimation of monthly prepayments due to refinancing and home sales from HMDA mortgage originations; (2) the division of prepayments from refinancing and home sales between securitized and unsecuritized loans; and (3) the allocation of prepayments from refinancing and home sales to securitizedloans of the different MBS insurer types. Section 4 describes the estimation of monthly prepayment effects on M2 according to institutional rules of the different MBS insurers. Section 5 evaluates the dollar effects of monthly mortgage prepayments on M2 in term of smoothness of M2 growth and stability of M2 velocity. Section 6 concludes. Figure 1 shows the flows of mortgage proceeds and the disbursement of mortgage prepayments. 
FLOW OF MORTGAGE PROCEEDS

MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT AMOUNTS
When the origination amount of a refinanced mortgage exceeds the outstanding balance of the corresponding old mortgage, the excess is called gross cash out. The dollar amount of the prepayment is the difference between the origination amount of the newly refinanced mortgage and the amount of gross cash out. Similarly, transfer of an existing home also results in a mortgage prepayment if the home seller has any mortgage on the house sold which is usually required to be paid off. The dollar amount of the prepayment is the outstanding balance of seller's existing home mortgage on the payoff date. As previously indicated, prepayments from MBSs being temporarily held by MBS servicers are normally required to be kept in M2-type deposits. This is the primary prepayment effect on M2.
When the gross cash out exceeds the sum of settlement costs and any payoffs to home equity debt, the excess amount are called free cash out. Borrowers can use free cash out as they wish. A home seller also has free cash when the sale price of the home exceeds the sum of the payoff to the old mortgage, home equity debt, and total transaction costs. Free cash out from refinancing and free cash received by home sellers can also stay in M2 deposits. In addition, mortgage settlements can have an effect on M2 because settlement companies are required to keep all funds collected at settlements briefly in M2-type deposits before disbursement. Thus, there can be secondary effects of mortgage prepayments resulting from free cash effects and the proceeds of mortgage settlements. To conserve space, only the primary effects of mortgage 6 prepayments on M2 are presented here. 5 Including mortgage prepayment secondary effects does not alter the basic results.
Mortgage refinancing and home purchases are motivated by different incentives.
Refinancing activity is mainly driven by coupon rate gap, which is defined as the ratio of the weighted average coupon rate on the outstanding stock of mortgages (WAC) to the prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rate. 6 Figure 3 indicates a positive relationship between the size of the coupon rate gap, and refinancing activity with about a one-month lag. 7 When the coupon rate gap is greater than 1.0, the volume of refinancing mortgage originations is boosted, resulting in three refinancing waves between 1995 and 2003: early 1996, 1998 to early 1999, and 2001 to 2003 . Home purchases are affected by seasonality and income, in addition to the level of mortgage rates. Figure 4 shows a strong seasonality of home purchases and a weaker negative relationship with mortgage rates. Home purchases tend to rise in spring and peak in summer due to preferences to move when schools are closed. Home purchases decline in fall and reach the trough in winter due to year-end holiday effects. Increases in disposable income also are expected to have positive effects on home purchase since higher levels of income raise the affordability of home ownership. 1. Derive prepayments by netting out some portions of mortgage originations using:
5 The secondary effects of mortgage prepayments are estimated in O'Brien (2004) . 6 Following Richard and Roll (1988) and J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (2003) , a ratio of the two rates is used here instead of the difference between the two rates. In term of percent savings (percent change in the present value of the loan), the ratio measure is a better indicator of mortgagor's refinancing incentives than the difference. 7 The correlation coefficient between one-month-lag coupon rate gaps and the values of HMDA refinancing mortgage originations increases steadily from .64 for the ten-year span of [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] 3.1.b Ratios of home sellers' prepayments to home purchasers' mortgage originations 10 Estimating how the effects of coupon rate gaps on gross cash out ratios are distributed over the current and the lagged coupon rate gaps is subject to some imprecision. Using an alternative series of actual gross cash out ratios, which are confidential, the coefficients for both the current and the lagged coupon rate gaps are negative and significant. Nonetheless, the resulting conclusions of this paper remain the same. 
Prepayments by loan securitization
In the second step, prepayments are split into two categories depending on whether the prepaid mortgages are securitized. Prepayments from securitized mortgages will affect M2.
Prepayments from unsecuritized loans serviced by mortgage originators themselves are immediately available funds for the lenders and are assumed to have no effects on M2.
Prepayments from unsecuritized mortgages serviced by third-parties may or may not affect M2.
Since only a small portion of unsecuritized mortgages are serviced by third-parties, any possible prepayment effect on M2 is small and is excluded from this analysis. Shares of prepayments to refinanced, . 12 The unsecuritized loans serviced by third-parties will have prepayment effects on M2 if the third-party servicers follow similar servicer guidelines of MBSs. Anecdotal information suggests that only a small portion of total portfolio-held loans are serviced by third-party servicers. Prepayment effects on M2 from portfolio-held mortgages are estimated in O'Brien (2004) . Exclusion of prepayment effects from portfolio-held loans does not alter the basic results of the analysis. It is possible that a loan originator may securitize its own-originated loans and keep some of the MBSs in its portfolio as investment. It is also possible that a small portion of sold loans may end up being unintentionally held unsecuritized in conduits' portfolios. For examples, conduits, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a few investment banking firms, hold both MBSs and unsecuritized loans in their portfolios. However, most unsecuritized loans held in the portfolios are conduits' inventories for future securitization. Thus, shares of sold loans serve as a good proxy for shares of securitized loans.
Prepayments by type of MBS insurers
Prepayments from securitized loans are further allocated among FNMA, FHLMC, GNMA, and others (mostly private conduits) because of differences in the MBS insurers' institutional rules governing the handling of prepayments, as described in Appendix B. An observable breakdown of prepayments cannot be derived directly from the HMDA data. 13 We use total monthly mortgage liquidations for the three GSEs, 
PREPAYMENT EFFECTS ON M2
As was described earlier in Section 2, mortgage prepayments affect M2 during the float period in which mortgage proceeds are kept in M2 deposits. The length of the float period varies with institutional rules of MBS insurers, which in turn affect the magnitude of prepayment effects on M2. In addition, mortgage origination dates (at the beginning, middle, or end of a month) also affect how long prepayment funds stay in M2 deposits. As a result, prepayments can sit in M2 deposits anywhere from one to fifty-five days. Prepayments received by MBS servicers at the beginning of a month tend to stay longer in M2 accounts than those received near the end of the month. To estimate the average time length that prepayments would stay in M2 accounts, we need to know within-month distributions of prepayments. Within-month distributions of mortgage prepayments to servicers are estimated from daily HMDA mortgage origination dates. The origination dates reported on HMDA are advanced by up to 6 days to reflect the actual payoff dates. 15 Within-month distributions of prepayments are then incorporated with the institutional rules of MBS insurers -FNMA, FHLMC, GNMA, and private insurers --to get M2 effects.
FNMA
There are various remittance schedules (see Appendix B) available to mortgage servicers of FNMA-insured MBSs. Most prepayments collected in a month by servicers are remitted to FNMA sometime in the following month. Only the prepayments from a portion of unsecuritized mortgages in its portfolio are remitted on the day of receipt (under the Actual/Actual remittance schedule of Appendix B). Thus, most prepayment proceeds collected from FNMA-insured
MBSs have first-month and second-month prepayment effects on M2.
The first-month (or the current-month) prepayment effect on M2 depends on the total value of prepayments and the daily within-month distribution of the prepayments received by servicers. It is estimated as a weighted average of daily prepayments collected by mortgage servicers in the month. The weights equal the fractions of the month remaining on the respective 15 Origination dates are defined here as the dates on which new loans are issued; while settlement dates are defined as the dates on which borrowers complete the loan process. According to a survey by Washington Mutual, settlement dates are usually reported as 'origination dates' on HMDA. To reflect the true dates of loan originations, we advance HMDA origination dates before calculations. The number of days used for advancing is depending on the day of the week of settlement dates, after accounting for the three-business-day right of recision for refinancing. For Monday refinancing-settlement dates, borrowers' right of recision expires at mid-night of Thursday, so settlement companies will not receive funds until Friday, nor will they record deeds of trust and send out payoffs until that day. For Tuesday settlement dates, borrowers' right of recision expires at mid-night of Friday, so deeds of trust recording, receipt of lenders' funds, and old loan payoffs are normally done on the following Monday. The process is usually completed in one day because settlement documents are signed in advance. The effect of prepayments in month t on M2 in month t+1 (the second-month effect) will depend on the daily distribution of remittances of the proceeds to FNMA in the second month.
The second month effects on M2 will equal a weighted average of daily remittances, with the weights equal to the fractions of the month expired on the respective remittance dates. Unlike daily prepayment distributions, remittance distributions depend on remittance schedules selected by MBS servicers, and information on the distributions for a sample month was provided by FNMA (see Appendix B, item 5)
The total effect on M2 in month t of refinancing (purchase) prepayments from FNMAinsured MBSs equal the current-month effects of the refinancing (purchase) prepayments received in month t plus the second-month effects of refinancing (purchase) prepayments received in month t-1 by servicers. The total effect on M2 in month t on FNMA-insured MBS prepayments due to both refinancing and purchases is equal to the sum of the total effect in month t from refinancing prepayments and that from purchase prepayments.
GNMA
Similar to FNMA's standard remittance schedule, all prepayments collected by servicers of GNMA-insured MBSs in a month are distributed to MBS holders in the following month, giving rise to first-month and second-month effects on M2. The within-month distributions of prepayments from GNMA-insured MBSs are assumed to be the same as those from FNMAinsured MBSs. Under this assumption, the weights for the average first-month prepayment effect on M2 derived from HMDA data for FNMA-insured MBSs are used for GNMA-insured 
FHLMC
As described in Appendix B, mortgage servicers must remit all prepayments from refinancing or purchases to FHLMC by the 5 th business day after the payoff date. The prepayments must be initially deposited into custodial accounts (demand deposits), but the proceeds may be withdrawn, on the same day, to be re-invested in fed funds or repurchase agreements. However, the proceeds must be re-deposited into the custodial accounts at least one t by servicers of FNMA-insured MBSs, and business day before the due date, unless the remittance is made before the due date. Thus, the minimum duration of the proceeds staying in demand deposits is one business day.
The prepayments received at least four business days before month end by servicers for FHLMC-insured MBS pools can have only the first-month effect on M2, while those received by the servicers within three business days before month end have only the second-month effect on M2 if all servicers keep the prepayments in demand deposits for a minimum duration. For this analysis, the proceeds are assumed to be in demand deposits on the 1 st and 5 th days after the payoff date. Under this assumption, the proceeds received from the 1 st day of the month to the 6th day before month-end date are in demand deposits for two nights in the month, and those received on the rest of the month are in demand deposits for one night in the current month and one night in the following month.
The weighted average of daily percentage distributions of prepayments for FHLMCinsured MBSs, W tt , and the effects on M2 in month t and month t+1 from month t prepayments are calculated following the methodology used for FNMA, based on the FHLMC prepayment options and remittance rules described above.
Private conduits
Based on information gathered from prospectuses of private-insured MBS pools and analysts at some investment banking firms, servicers for private insured MBS pools are also Thus, total effects of prepayments from private mortgage deals are estimated with the same method as that for the GSEs.
Total prepayment effects on M2
The primary effects of total prepayments of all U. S. securitized refinancing (purchase) (6) and (7) show, respectively, the breakdown of total dollar effects by loan purpose --refinancing and home purchases. Columns (8) and (9) (2) to (4), are computed as actual M2 levels, column (1), minus the dollar prepayment effects on M2, respectively, due to both refinancing and home sales, column (5), due to refinancing alone, column (6), and due to home sales alone, column (7). Table 3 presents contributions of mortgage prepayment effects to annualized monthly M2 growth rates, which measure the ratios of current monthly changes in dollar prepayment effects to actual M2 levels in the previous months, Equation [4.5.6] . Contributions from total (refinancing and home sale) prepayment effects on M2 growth rates, column (5), range from +3.9 percentage points to -8.2 percentage points in the nine years from 1995 to 2003. Columns (6) and (7) show the separate contributions to M2 growth rates, respectively, from refinancing and home sales. Column (6), also Figure 8 , implies that the contributions to M2 growth from refinancing prepayments are volatile and sometimes large during large refinancing periods.
EVALUATION OF MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT EFFECTS ON M2
Effects of mortgage prepayments on M2
They account for most of M2 volatility induced by mortgage prepayments. In contrast, the contributions from home sales, column (7), also Figure 9 , are small (no more one half percentage point) and stable, although seasonal. Table 3 also shows annualized growth rates of actual M2 and growth rates of three alternatively adjusted M2. Growth rates of three adjusted M2, columns (2) to (4), are computed, respectively, as the annualized percentage changes of the three corresponding adjusted M2 levels, columns (2) to (4) of Table 2.  19 Table 3 (2) with column (3) indicates that the growth pattern of M2 adjusted for contributions of total prepayment effects are similar to that adjusted for refinancing prepayment effects. This is because refinancing prepayment effects dominate total prepayment effects. As a result, growth pattern of M2 adjusted for purchase prepayment effects, column (4), resembles that of actual M2, column (1).
Comparison of smoothness of M2 growth rates
There is a presumption that mortgage prepayments have boosted M2 growth during refinancing surges and depressed them when refinancing subsided. Consistent with this presumption, the results of this analysis indicate that monthly growth rates of adjusted M2 are smoother than actual M2 growth rates.
As expected, the standard deviations in Table 4 indicate that monthly growth rates of M2 adjusted for effects of total mortgage prepayments and those of M2 adjusted for refinancing Table 4 implies that there is little difference between the variation of actual M2 and that of M2 adjusted for the effects of purchase prepayments. Columns (5) to (7) in Table 4 show, respectively, standard deviations of the effects of total prepayments, refinancing prepayments, and purchase prepayments, which imply that variation of refinancing prepayment effects accounts for most of the effects of total prepayments.
So do the coefficients of variations of the effects of total prepayments, column (11), and refinancing prepayments, column (12). Column (7) indicates that variation of purchase prepayment effects is small. The results are consistent with the variations of actual M2 and adjusted M2.
Comparison of stability of M2 velocity
The link between money and GDP is presumed to be stable over time under normal conditions. Thus, if mortgage prepayments affect M2 growth rates, then the relationship between adjusted M2 and GDP should be more stable than that between actual M2 and GDP. Table 5 and Figure 11 present quarterly velocities of actual M2 and the three alternatively adjusted series for M2. Velocity of M2 adjusted for effects of total prepayments and velocity of M2 adjusted for only refinancing prepayments tend to be less variable than velocity of actual M2. In particular, during high refinancing periods, the magnitude of fluctuations of M2 velocity is greatly reduced by adjustments for prepayment effects. Table 6 shows the standard deviations of velocity of actual M2 and adjusted M2. 
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis describes the methodology used to estimate mortgage prepayment primary effects on M2, based on micro data from HMDA for1995 to 2003. The two major sources of prepayments, refinancing and home sales are included and their effects are measured separately.
The results suggest that mortgage prepayments indeed affect M2 growth. Adjusted M2
has smoother monthly growth rates than actual M2. Variation from refinancing prepayment effects on M2 accounts for most of the variation of total prepayment effects. There is little difference between the variation of actual M2 and that of M2 adjusted for the effects of homesale prepayments. Further, the results clearly show that stability of the relationship between money and GDP as measured by M2 velocity is increased after excluding the primary effects of mortgage prepayments from actual M2. To conserve space, secondary effects of mortgage prepayments on M2, such as from free cash effects and settlement effects, were not included in the estimates. Inclusion of the secondary effects of mortgage prepayments does not alter the conclusion of the study (O'Brien, 2004) .
HMDA data are available usually with about an eight-month lag. To analyze mortgage prepayment effects on M2 for periods for which HMDA data are not yet available, the methodology described in this study can be applied to forecasts of mortgage originations. Such forecasts may be produced from econometric models, that link timely mortgage application data published by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) to the mortgage origination data from HMDA (Lehnert, 2002).
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF MONTHLY GROSS CASH OUT RATIOS
Monthly gross cash out ratios are derived based on the following steps:
1. Derive monthly gross cash out ratios ( . 4. Obtain the adjusted monthly gross cash out ratio ( r t Rgco ) by multiplying the estimated monthly gross cash out ratios from step 1 with the ratios produced from step 3:
. * . 2) Express -prepayments by the 4 th business of the month (implying 3 -34 days float) 7. Duration of prepayments in M2: 0 --50 days.
II. Freddie Mac's (FHLMC) Portfolio Holdings and its Guaranteed MBSs
Flow of mortgage payments -interests, and scheduled and unscheduled principals (prepayments)
Home owners (or settlement companies for refinancing and home sales, which receive mortgage proceeds from new loan lenders) mortgage servicers FHLMC MBS holders. 
III. Ginnie Mae (GNMA) Guaranteed MBSs
Flow of mortgage payments -interests, and scheduled and unscheduled principals (prepayments)
Home owners (or settlement companies for refinancing and home sales, which receive mortgage proceeds from new loan lenders) mortgage servicers MBS holders.
Custodial accounts for servicers -non-interest bearing deposits accounts (DD), funds remain
in the accounts all the time until being directly distributed to MBS holders by servicers. 
APPENDIX C. ADJUSTMENT OF MONTHLY SHARES OF SOLD-LOANS
Sold-loan shares of HMDA data vary greatly with loan purposes and from year to year, as indicated below.
Frequency of Yearly Peak of Sold-Loan-Shares in a Month (1995 to 2003)
Sold-loan shares for purchase loans are more stable than for refinanced loans. Hence, sold-loan shares and adjustments for reporting bias are derived separately for the two types of loans (see Figures 6 and 7) . 20 These two figures also indicate that sold-loan shares rise when mortgage rates decline and vise versa, and they tend to peak near the trough of mortgage rates, indicating their negative relationship. This is because investors' demand for newly securitized MBSs is stronger in the periods of falling than rising mortgage rates. Thus, we allow adjustments for reporting bias to vary from year to year according to movements of mortgage rates.
To estimate adjustments for reporting bias, we first estimate the relationship between sold-loan shares and levels of mortgage rates based on Equations C.1 and C.2 below, respectively, for refinancing and purchase loans (including only monthly dummies with significant coefficients). A lagged dependent variable is added on the right-hand side of each equation to correct the serial correlation of disturbances. Tables 7 and 8 show the regression results of the two equations. Mortgage rates have significant negative effects on sold-loan shares for both refinancing and purchases. The coefficients of seasonal dummies indicate that reporting bias is significant in only four months --the last four months of the year for purchases, and the last three months of the year for refinancing. The closer of the month to year end the larger the reporting bias is, as reflected by the more negative of the coefficients. Comparing with purchase loans, refinancing mortgage originations are mostly driven by levels of mortgage rates, instead of seasonal factors, so soldloan shares for refinancing are less stable. We calculate sold-loan shares for refinancing after advancing HMDA data 4 or 6 days to account for a lag between actual origination dates and the reported origination (i.e. settlement) dates. Thus, loans settled toward the end of December are shifted to January, so January loan-sold shares for refinancing may also contain reporting bias.
To adjust reporting bias, we follow the steps below:
1. Estimate sold-loan share for each month in a year based on estimated regression coefficients for Equations C.1 and C.2 excluding monthly dummies.
2. Calculate monthly changes of the estimated values from step 1.
3. Replace the estimated sold-loan shares obtained from step 1 with actual values from HMDA data for the no-bias months -the first nine months for refinancing and the first eight months for purchases. 4. The final adjusted level series are constructed by linking the changes for the last three or four bias-months of the year (obtained from step 2) to the level series (obtained from step 3) beginning September for refinancing and August for purchases for each year.
Fig. 1: Flow of Mortgage Proceeds
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